Food security, urban governance and multilevel government in Africa by De Visser, Jaap
269© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
R. Home (ed.), Land Issues for Urban Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Local and Urban Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52504-0_17
Chapter 17
Food Security, Urban Governance 
and Multilevel Government in Africa
Jaap de Visser
Abstract Realising the right to food requires more than an increase in food produc-
tion. Increasing access to food is equally important, so this contribution adopts a 
“food systems approach”. Against the backdrop of a growing number of countries 
on the continent that are decentralising powers to cities and regions, this chapter 
assesses the role of local governments in South Africa with respect to food security. 
It argues that food security is not just a national and/or provincial government con-
cern, but that the Constitution demands of municipalities to contribute to realising 
the right to food. Against the backdrop of a general introduction into the division of 
responsibilities between national, provincial and local government, it deploys two 
arguments to make this assertion. The first is located in the jurisprudence of the 
South African Constitutional Court on socio-economic rights. The second is located 
in the division of powers between national, provincial and local government. This 
contribution explores various linkages between a municipality’s constitutional pow-
ers and food security. Specific emphasis is placed on the municipality’s responsibil-
ity to regulate trade and markets as well as its responsibility to conduct spatial 
planning and land-use management. The argument made in this chapter is also rel-
evant in other countries on the continent that combine socio-economic rights with 
multilevel government arrangements.
Keywords Food security · Local government · Provincial government · Multilevel 
government · Food-sensitive planning · Right to food · Spatial planning · Land-use 
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South Africa produces enough food to feed its people, yet household food insecurity 
and malnutrition are unacceptably high (Oxfam 2014). It is commonly argued that 
addressing food insecurity is primarily the responsibility of the national and provin-
cial governments and that local government’s role is limited (Steytler 2009). Food 
security is typically associated with food production and thus with agriculture, and, 
since the Constitution allocates agriculture to the national and provincial govern-
ments, local government bears little responsibility, so the argument goes (S 44(1) & 
104(1): Constitution). This chapter argues that this is a wrong proposition for vari-
ous reasons, and its argument is also relevant in other countries with constitutional 
arrangements similar to South Africa’s.
First, food security is as much about access and quality as it is about production. 
South Africa’s food insecurity challenge is linked to poverty and inequality, which 
constrains people’s access to, and ability to make food choices. Most South Africans 
are too poor to make healthy food choices and are thus food insecure. A 2016 survey 
revealed that 19.9% of households had run out of money to buy food in 12 months 
prior to the survey (Statssa 2016), a situation not addressed by increasing produc-
tion. Secondly, there are many structural and systemic problems in South Africa’s 
food system that impedes food security. For example, the food value chain is domi-
nated by large-scale farmers, major agri-processors and big retail stores, although 
diversity in the food value chain is essential for a sustainable food system 
(Oxfam 2014).
These two arguments may dispel the notion that food insecurity is agricultural, 
and therefore primarily a national and provincial issue. The right of access to suffi-
cient food in the Constitution (S 27(1) (b)) suggests that it is a responsibility of 
national government, not municipalities, through increasing food production and 
ensuring a welfare safety net for the most vulnerable. The Constitutional Court, 
however, has interpreted the responsibilities of local government in other socio- 
economic rights differently, holding municipalities accountable for aspects of the 
right to housing despite the Constitution listing housing as a power of national and 
provincial governments (Schedule 4 Part A). In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another, the City argued 
it could not be held accountable for the provision of shelter to a group of residents 
made destitute by eviction from private land, partly because the Constitution did not 
allocate housing as a power to local government (Blue Moonlight: Para 50). The 
Court disagreed and held the city responsible for providing shelter to communities 
rendered homeless, emanating from the Bill of Rights (Blue Moonlight: Para 67). 
This has consequences for the responsibility of local government to realise the right 
of access to food. Just as municipalities are responsible for critical aspects of the 
right to housing, despite it not being a constitutional local government function, so 
too are they responsible for critical aspects of the right to food, despite the fact that 
the Constitution does not allocate “agriculture” to municipalities. Where the realisa-
tion of the right intersects with municipal responsibilities, even where assigned by 
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statute, the municipality was responsible. The same should then apply to the right of 
access to food in section 27(1) (b) of the Constitution: municipalities are responsi-
ble for those parts of the fulfilment of the right of access to food that intersect with 
what is regularly done by municipalities.
To understand better this intersection between multilevel government and food 
security, this chapter first asks how food security intersects with the division of pow-
ers set out in the Constitution, and what points of leverage do sub-national govern-
ments, particularly municipalities, have. After tracing the constitutional division of 
powers between national and provincial governments in South Africa, case law rein-
forcing the role of municipalities in planning and management of land is explored 
as creating opportunities for a greater municipal role in food security matters. 
Finally, the relevance of South Africa’s experience for the constitutions and multi-
level governance in other African states is discussed.
17.2  The Constitutional Architecture
The Constitution relates to a federal state but with strong unitary elements, while 
allocating significant powers to local government. At the centre of this division of 
powers is a list of powers (Schedule 4A) allocated to national and provincial gov-
ernments with authority to make and implement law on these matters. In case of 
conflict between a national and a provincial law, the Constitutional Court decides 
whose law prevails, using the criteria in section 146. The list of concurrent powers 
is extensive and includes matters such as environment, health, housing, welfare ser-
vices and agriculture. This means that both national and provincial governments 
may regulate agriculture, a critical function related to food security, but provinces 
are unlikely to make agriculture laws that depart from national policy, because the 
criteria for national law prevailing over provincial weigh heavily towards the 
national government (De Visser 2017).
The Constitution also reserves some powers to provinces exclusively (Schedule 
5A). The national government may not make law on those matters except in special 
circumstances (S 44 (2)). Schedule 5A includes matters such as provincial sport, 
provincial cultural services and veterinary services, which are hardly of fundamen-
tal importance to the state, and do not relate to food security, with two possible 
exceptions (abattoirs and provincial planning).
The Constitution also allocates powers exclusively to national government, any 
power not mentioned in Schedule 4 or Schedule 5, and includes major powers, such 
as the judiciary, mining and (most parts of) policing. This affects the powers around 
food security: land administration (i.e. rules of land tenure) is a national compe-
tency, meaning that neither provinces nor municipalities can make laws regulating 
farmland tenure (De Visser 2017).
The Constitution also contains specific and exclusive municipal powers subject 
to national and provincial minimum standards (Schedules 4B and 5B). For example, 
municipalities decide on rezoning and subdivision (part of “municipal planning”, 
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Schedule 4B) but national and provincial governments may determine minimum 
standards. There are many powers in the schedules that intersect with food security 
as will be elaborated below.
The intergovernmental financing system has a centralising effect on relations 
between national and provincial governments. Provinces are almost exclusively 
funded by the national government, raising little revenue of their own (Khumalo 
et  al. 2011), which discourages legislative innovation by provinces, particularly 
when a new provincial law would require significant funding. For example, no prov-
ince is likely to pass legislation with “high-cost” experimentation concerning agri-
cultural subsidies, because it does not have a revenue model outside the structures 
of existing national law (De Visser 2017).
The effect of the intergovernmental fiscal system varies. Metropolitan and local 
municipalities have important revenue-raising powers (mainly property taxation 
and fees for services such as electricity, water, sanitation and sewerage), and are 
largely self-reliant, raising significant own revenue, complemented by intergovern-
mental funding in the form of the equitable share and conditional grants. Metropolitan 
municipalities’ revenue model thus permits them to pursue distinct policy objec-
tives, as can local municipalities with a significant urban base, but municipalities 
with no urban base and overwhelmingly indigent populations rely much more on 
intergovernmental funding (Steytler and Ayele 2018).
17.3  Local Government Powers and Food Security
Given the multidimensional nature of food security, many local government compe-
tencies are indirectly linked to realising the right of access to food, two in particular. 
Firstly, access to safe and healthy food is compromised without access to potable 
water, and the Constitution guarantees right of access to water (S 27(1) (b), and 
municipalities are responsible for water services (S 156 (1)). Municipalities are also 
responsible for the reticulation of electricity, essential for cooking and cold storage 
(S 156 (1)). The Constitution not only empowers but also instructs municipalities to 
provide these services. Municipalities are compelled in the Bill of Rights to ensure 
access to water and electricity services to all, important deal for realising the right 
of access to food, by extending infrastructure to communities lacking a safe and 
sustainable source or connection. How municipalities structure their electricity and 
water tariffs, (S 74 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act) is also important 
since food insecurity is inextricably linked to poverty.
Another intersection between food security and local government powers relates 
to local food trade, where the Constitution Part B lists three local government pow-
ers: trading regulations (Schedule 4), markets (Schedule 5) and street trading 
(Schedule 5). Municipalities may adopt and enforce trading by-laws, best under-
stood as a power to regulate the impact of trade on the local built environment and 
community (Steytler and De Visser 2007). Municipalities may also regulate and 
operate markets (S 156 (1)), including open air markets, food markets, fresh 
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produce markets, the term relating to an area, designated or managed by the munici-
pality where stalls are set out for trading, often (but not always) limited to certain 
days of the week. Municipalities should realise the strategic importance of food 
markets in the food value chain, not to be treated as informal or the “deli” exception 
to the supermarket, but an indispensable part of the food value chain, improving 
access to healthy food, particularly for lower-income communities (Chonco 2015). 
Municipalities should use their regulatory competencies to influence trading prac-
tices in and around fresh produce markets, ensuring law and order, basic facilities 
and infrastructure, such as cold storage. The last municipal function is street trad-
ing, the operation of a small retail business in a regular public space with the per-
mission of the municipality but not in a market, combining many similar businesses.
Municipal planning is an important local government power to plan and manage 
the use of land, and is distinct from the power to regulate forms of land tenure and 
ownership, which is a national power (Berrisford 2011). The Constitutional Court 
has many times determined that town planning is a municipal function, not to be 
interfered with by national and provincial governments (De Visser and Poswa 
2019). They must limit their involvement to regulating frameworks for the effective 
performance by municipalities of this power, not to exercise or remove a municipal-
ity’s planning powers. The 2013 Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 
(SPLUMA) codifies and regulates this division of powers.
Municipal planning has two major components under SPLUMA. The first is the 
power of the municipality to adopt a Municipal Spatial Development Framework 
(MSDF) and smaller-scale spatial development frameworks (S 5(1) (a) & (b)). The 
MSDF is a spatial development vision for a municipal area, to inform future infra-
structure investment and land-use decision-making (S 20 & 21). The MSDF does 
not grant land-use rights, but sets policy for land-use schemes and land-use manage-
ment decisions (S 22 & 24 (1) (g)), important for a municipality’s role in realising 
food security, connecting initiatives and public investment of government institu-
tions across the three spheres of government. The second component is the power to 
determine permitted land uses in the municipality through an adopted land-use (or 
zoning) scheme and determining applications from landowners and developers to 
change zoning, amend the permitted land use, subdivide, and change land-use 
restrictions in title deeds and consent uses. Municipal decision-making on land-use 
rights is important in improving food security.
Constitution establishes municipalities in South Africa (S 151 (1)), including all 
agricultural land. By using its power to rezone or subdivide, a municipality may 
rezone agricultural land for residential, commercial or other non-agricultural pur-
poses, which affect agricultural production and food security (Steytler 2009). 
Subjecting the subdivision of agricultural land to approval of the national Minister 
of Agriculture (S 70: SALA) gives him/her a veto power over municipal planning 
decisions affecting agricultural land.
The history of SALA is important. The Act was adopted long before the intro-
duction of the current local government regime. At the time, agricultural areas were 
largely excluded from the boundaries of local governments and SALA was applied 
there to control the conversion of agricultural land. SALA survived the introduction 
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of the new local government regime (Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd V Stalwo (Pty) Ltd): 
2009) and thus continues to apply and now subjects municipal planning decisions 
on agricultural land to a national veto.
The most important argument in its favour is that the incentive structure for 
municipalities fundamentally works against preserving agricultural land. The levy-
ing of property rates and the sale of municipal services (such as water, electricity, 
sanitation and refuse removal) are critical sources of revenue for municipalities. 
There is, thus, a clear incentive for municipalities to convert agricultural land into 
land for commercial and residential purposes and little, or no, incentive for them to 
retain agricultural land, so the argument goes (Steytler 2009). Secondly, it can be 
argued that the assessment of the agricultural potential of a piece of land requires 
specialised expertise. This expertise is not present in municipalities who are not 
geared towards regulating agriculture (which is not their function). It is present in 
provincial and national departments of agriculture (Steytler 2009).
One argument against SALA is that it is based on the assumption that farm size 
determines productivity, something on which agricultural experts disagree 
(Johnstone 2020). What constitutes a viable farm unit depends on matters such as 
soil conditions, rainfall and, most importantly, the type of agricultural model pur-
sued on that farm. In fact, and this is the second argument against the current model, 
SALA was introduced and still functions to protect a powerful commercial agricul-
tural industry, comprising of commercial farmers, the vast majority of whom are 
white. The Act has been singled out as a key obstacle to the transformation of the 
agricultural sector and the entrance of new, black agricultural entrepreneurs.
There are also legal arguments against SALA. Municipalities enjoy strong con-
stitutional protection of their planning powers, confirmed and clarified in 
Constitutional Court judgments in Table 17.1. In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 (9) BCLR 859 (CC), the City 
of Johannesburg asked the Constitutional Court to declare parts of the Development 
Facilitation Act (DFA) unconstitutional. The DFA empowered provincial planning 
tribunals to take land-use decisions, something that the Constitution reserves for 
municipalities, so the city argued. The Constitutional Court agreed with the city and 
declared parts of the DFA unconstitutional. This essentially located municipalities 
at the centre of the land-use management framework. In subsequent years, more 
constitutional litigation on this followed. Without fail, each judgement confirmed 
the approach taken in Gauteng Development Tribunal, namely, that national and 
provincial governments may not usurp the powers of municipalities with respect to 
“municipal planning”. The national government does not trump municipal land-use 
decisions by issuing mining licences (Maccsands). Provincial governments may not 
subject municipal land-use decisions to a veto, even if the development impacts on 
an entire region (Lagoonbay). Provincial governments may also not subject munici-
pal land-use decisions or building approvals to provincial or national appeals 
(Habitat Council, Pieterse, Tronox and Chairman of the National Building 
Regulations Appeal Board). Five key judgments are summarised below, and, given 
that firm jurisprudential trend, SALA might not survive a constitutional challenge 
to its ministerial veto powers over municipal land-use management decisions.
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The policy and constitutional flaws of SALA should not be read to imply that 
municipal power to change the permitted use of agricultural land must be unfet-
tered. The challenges surrounding the orientation of municipalities towards devel-
opment and the capacity lacuna in local government on agriculture are very real and 
serious. However, the current regime must be replaced by a more refined regime. 
SPLUMA, the new legislative regime for municipal planning, is an important start 
to that. It regulates how municipalities must conduct their spatial planning and land- 
use management. There are at least eight specific provisions in SPLUMA that relate 
to the agricultural potential of land under consideration for rezoning or 
subdivision:
 1. The Preamble to the Act specifically mentions the right to food as one of the driv-
ers for the adoption and implementation of SPLUMA.
 2. Section 3(d) of SPLUMA includes “the sustainable and efficient use of land” as 
one of its objects.
 3. Section 7(b)(ii) of SPLUMA instructs municipalities to “ensure that special con-
sideration is given to the protection of prime and agricultural land”.
 4. Section 8(2) of the Act empowers the national Minister to proclaim norms and 
standards on matters such as “desirable settlement patterns”, “rural revitalisa-
tion” and “sustainable development”.
 5. Section 12(1)(n) of the Act stipulates that spatial development frameworks must 
“give effect to (...) the sustainable utilisation and protection of agricultural land”.
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 6. Section 21(j) of the Act specifies this for municipalities and insists that the 
MSDF must include “a strategic assessment of the environmental pressures and 
opportunities within the municipal area, including … high potential agricul-
tural land”.
 7. Section 25(1) of the Act demands that municipal land-use schemes must have 
“minimal impact on … natural resources”.
 8. Section 52 (1) of the Act empowers the national Minister to decide land develop-
ment applications “where such an application materially impacts on (...) food 
security (…) or land use for agriculture”. While this provision may sound similar 
to what is provided in SALA, it differs in two important respects. Firstly, while 
SALA provides for a veto on a municipal decision, SPLUMA provides for a 
procedure alongside the municipal procedure and resulting in a separate deci-
sion. Secondly, while SALA locates the veto power in the Minister responsible 
for agriculture, SPLUMA locates this national power in the Minister of Rural 
Development and Land Reform.
Proponents of SALA may argue that the above do not provide equivalent protection 
as the ministerial veto, but they do protect agricultural resources against harmful 
development less restrictively than the ministerial veto. The powers under section 
52, in particular, empower the national government to stop development that may 
harm food security, ultimately with the same effect as the SALA veto.
As well as impacting the availability or production of healthy food, municipal 
planning powers also affect the municipality’s ability to facilitate access, particu-
larly for disadvantaged communities. Take, for example, a municipality’s power 
over zoning, i.e. the adoption of a land-use (or zoning) scheme and the alteration of 
existing zonings. (S 24, 28 & 41: SPLUMA). Much of South Africa’s formal plan-
ning landscape for suburbs is characterised by “single-use zones”, i.e. the separation 
of residential, commercial, industrial and other uses. Commercial activity is gener-
ally discouraged in residential areas. While this approach serves a peaceful subur-
ban lifestyle, separate from the hustle and bustle of commercial areas, it makes little 
sense in South Africa’s low-income and informal areas where residential and infor-
mal business activity flows into one another. Residential dwellings are used for 
commercial use, and it is not uncommon for informal retailers to reside in the places 
from which they trade. In that context, the dogged insistence on single-use zones as 
the norm, constricts and imposes a heavy regulatory burden on informal entrepre-
neurial activity. Deviation from the single-use zoning norm necessitates applica-
tions for departures, consent uses, rezoning and building permits and thus entails 
(oftentimes expensive) bureaucracy. Ultimately, it pushes small, informal busi-
nesses into illegality (Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation 2017). SPLUMA now 
expects municipalities to extend land-use schemes (or zoning schemes) into infor-
mal areas (S 24 (1): SPLUMA). However, it also instructs them to do so sensibly 
and incrementally, i.e. with due consideration of effects such as the above (S 24 (2): 
SPLUMA). For example, section 24(2)(c) of SPLUMA instructs municipalities to 
“include provisions that permit the incremental introduction of land use manage-
ment and regulation in areas under traditional leadership, rural areas, informal 
J. de Visser
277
settlements, slums and areas not previously subject to a land use scheme”. 
Furthermore, SPLUMA envisages the adoption of municipal planning by-laws that 
deal with the enforcement of land-use schemes (De Visser and Poswa 2019).
The Constitutional Court has accepted that asymmetrical enforcement of munici-
pal rules, such as municipal tariffs, is permissible if there is an underlying, rational 
policy that is formally expressed (City Council of Pretoria V Walker 1998). It can 
be argued that the extension of zoning rules into low-income and informal areas can 
be accompanied by low-intensity enforcement of those zoning rules in order not to 
chase microenterprises into illegality (De Visser and Poswa 2019). Small, informal 
food outlets play a critical role in local food system (Johnstone 2020). It follows, 
therefore that a municipality’s efforts to use its zoning powers to regularise (or not) 
microenterprises matters a great deal for local food systems.
Furthermore, the municipality can influence the regulatory and bureaucratic bur-
den that is imposed on informal food traders in low-income and informal settle-
ments. SPLUMA recognises the bureaucratic burden that the planning system 
imposes. It instructs municipalities to identify areas in its MSDF “where incremen-
tal approaches to development and regulation will be applicable” and where “short-
ened land use development procedures may be applicable and land use schemes 
may be so amended” (S 21 (k) & (i) (ii): SPLUMA). It is argued that municipalities 
should consider finding ways to ease the regulatory burden on informal food traders 
in low-income and informal settlements. This may relate also to the setting of tariffs 
for land-use applications: the municipality now controls the tariff structure and 
could consider adopting a progressive tariff structure that encourages informal trad-
ers to regularise their building and planning approval. In short, a progressive 
approach by the municipality to the regulatory burden surrounding planning and 
building regulations could enable more informal traders to formalise the planning 
approvals pertaining to their businesses. This adds stability to their operations and 
increases their chances of accessing capital and overall benefits for the accessibility 
of healthy food particularly in disadvantaged areas.
A third example of a point of leverage for a municipality that may be used to 
facilitate greater access to healthy food relates to the use of conditions to land-use 
approvals. A municipality that is considering a land-use application, such as an 
application for rezoning, subdivision, consent use, etc., has leverage over the appli-
cant. Section 43(1) of SPLUMA provides that an application may be approved sub-
ject to such conditions as the municipality prescribes. This leverage can, and should, 
be used by the municipality to negotiate outcomes that go beyond the narrow inter-
ests of the applicant in a land-use right. This already happens. It is common for 
municipalities to impose condition that assist it to recoup the additional bulk expen-
diture (e.g. a new sewerage plant) required to make the development possible. More 
progressively, cities are starting to approve inner city commercial housing projects 
together with conditions that force developers to include low-cost housing units into 
the development (Ndifuna Ukwazi 2018). It is argued that municipalities should 
explore using this leverage to impose conditions that force developers into the 
behaviour that improves the food system, such as facilitating market access for 
small and informal traders. For example, why not add a condition to the approval of 
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a retail mall development that a certain percentage of the floor space is designated 
for small, emerging food retailers?
17.4  Relevance Elsewhere
How far are these arguments relevant for countries elsewhere on the continent? An 
increasing number of constitutions list sub-national powers, whether federations, 
such as Ethiopia and Nigeria or “semi-federations” such as Kenya. Others are coun-
tries setting out the powers of local government in their Constitutions include 
Uganda, Tunisia and Zambia. The arguments in this chapter interpreting sub- 
national powers, such as those related to planning, trade and markets, to link to food 
security could find resonance in those countries. Constitutions with enforceable 
socio-economic rights are scarcer, although countries such as Uganda and Nigeria 
list them as duties on the state but not as rights enforceable in court. Kenya is an 
exception, with a Constitution containing justiciable economic and social rights and 
devolution of powers to counties. Article 43 contains rights pertaining to healthcare, 
housing, sanitation, food, water, social security and education, and enforcement of 
these rights by the Kenyan courts will doubtless affect the devolution of functions 
and powers (De Visser 2015).
17.5  Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the duty to realise the right of access to food in South 
Africa is not exclusively to national and provincial governments, but many func-
tions allocated to local government allow municipalities to make meaningful contri-
butions on the right of access to food. Certain planning responsibilities ultimately 
impact food production and can improve the availability of food. The legal frame-
work for controlling development of agricultural land is no longer appropriate, and 
a new approach should move away from focus on farm size as a proxy for productiv-
ity, to recognise the enhanced status of local government in the regulation and con-
trol of land use. Municipal planning responsibilities are equally important to better 
balance the role of large retailers and local food traders in the market. They can 
reduce the regulatory burden on food traders in low-income and informal settle-
ments. Other municipal competencies that can improve access to healthy and nutri-
tious food include regulating fresh produce markets to connect small-scale farmers 
and informal traders to consumers.
This chapter does not claim that the above suggestions as policy proposals and 
policy experts may disagree or have other proposals but argues rather that local 
government powers allow intervention to improve the right of access to food, which 
can benefit all South Africans. Returning to the original research question, there are 
many points where local government powers intersect with what is required to 
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realise the right of access to food. If municipalities use this leverage constructively 
and progressively, more progress can be made in the quest to ensure access to food.
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